Free Term Paper on Stereotyping
Stereotyping
Stereotyping is a form of pre judgment that is as prevalent in
today\'s society as it was 2000 years ago. It is a social attitude that has
stood the test of time and received much attention by social psychologists and
philosophers alike. Many approaches to or theories of stereotyping have thus
been raised. This essay evaluates the cognitive approach that categorization is
an essential cognitive process that inevitably leads to stereotyping. Hamilton
(1979) calls this a \'depressing dilemma\'.
Brown\'s (1995) definition
of stereotyping through prejudice is the \'holding of derogatory social
attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the
display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards members of a group on
account of their membership to that group\'. This definition implies that
stereotyping is primarily a group process, through the individuals psyche\'s
within that group. A further idea of stereotyping, defined by Allport (1954) as
\'thinking ill of others without warrant\', is that people \'make their mind
up\' without any personal experience. This pre judgment about a whole group is
then transferred to the stigmatization of any individuals in that group. It is
these ideas that the essay aims to evaluate, through the cognitive process of
categorisation and the above definitions that bring about three distinct
features of stereotyping, that our cognition can be demonstrated through.
The first characteristic of stereotyping is over-generalisation. A
number of studies conducted found that different combinations of traits were
associated with groups of different ethnic and national origin (Katz and Braly,
1933). However, stereotyping does not imply that all members of a group are
judged in these ways, just that a typical member of a group can be categorised
in such judgements, that they possess the characteristics of the group. Still,
when we talk of a group, we do so by imagining a member of that group.
The second feature and characteristic of stereotyping is the
exaggeration of the difference between ones own group (the in-group) and the
\'other\' group (the out-group). This can be traced back to the work of Tajfel
during the 1950\'s - \'the accentuation principle\' (Tajfel, 1981). Tajfel\'s
work was specifically on physical stimuli, and concluded that judgements on such
stimuli are not made in isolation, but in the context of other factors. Applied
socially - a judgement about an out-group relies upon other factors surrounding
the judgement in question, as well as making a statement about the in-group and
the relationship between the two groups. Through stereotyping and categorisation
we exaggerate the differences between the groups. From this comes the effect
that in believing an out-group is homogenous, through exaggerated differences,
their in-group is not - with very much less over-generalisation taking place
(Linville, et al., 1986).
The third characteristic of stereotyping is
that of the expression of values. Most stereotypical judgements of group
characteristics are in fact moral evaluations (Howitt, et al., 1989). For
example, Katz and Braly (1933) studied a group of students\' attitudes to
towards minority groups. They found that Jews were attributed to being \'mean\'
(in terms of money), rather than they themselves being \'spendthrifts\'. Also,
they found that there was a strong view that French people were \'excitable\'.
This actually implies that they are over-excitable - above the norm, as
everybody is excitable, per se, and thus there would be no necessity to mention
it. Concluding from this, it is valid to say that a value has been put on a
characteristic - in this case, a stereotypical one.
A criticism with
much of this research is that participants are asked to make judgements out of
social context - in abstract situations. Howitt, et al. (1989) say that this
leads to a derogatory implication: that attributing a group with a
characteristic is also withholding others. However, stereotyping leads to more
than merely placing an adjective onto a group or category. The cognitive
processes that give reason to stereotyping are much deeper than this, giving
rise to the above characteristics.
The cognitive approach to
stereotyping is that we all stereotype, at varying levels - because of the
essential cognitive process of categorisation (Brown, 1995). Howitt, et al.
(1989) take this view also, and add that it is an ordinary process of thought to
over-generalise, and then protect it.
We live in a complex social
environment, which we need to simplify into groups, or categories. This
simplification is present at all levels of life - it is part of our language,
distinguishing between dog and cat, male and female, and even in the basic
motives of distinguishing between food and non-food. Such categorisation may
seem linguistically simple, but is essential - for example, the classification
of elements and organisms by biologists and chemists: \'one of the most basic
functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into
classifications\' (Rosch, et al., 1976). However, the point must be made that,
even though language suggests so, categorisation leads to different functions
and features in non-humans and humans. For stereotyping is not present in
non-humans, thus, we may come to the conclusion that stereotyping is possible
through linguistics - this topic is discussed further later. This categorisation
also has varying depths of moral meaning, or value, which can lead to varying
levels of stereotyping. For example, the categorisation of Catholic - Protestant
in Northern Ireland. Categorisation is seen as a way of ordering what we
perceive (Billig, 1985), stimuli of the external world that needs to be
simplified, using \'iconic images, to pass into our short-term memory\'
(Neisser, 1976). This simplification process transforms James\' \'blooming,
buzzing confusion\' into a more manageable world in which it is easier to adapt
- categorisation is a cognitive adaptation. For we do not have the capability to
respond differently to each stimulus, whether it be a person, an object, or an
event. Categorisation is important in every day life, as well as in the most
extreme of circumstances - for example, the discrimination between friend and
foe.
For categorisation to be useful, we enhance the difference between
groups. This was found to be the case at both social and physical levels, and
later became known as the \'accentuation principle\' (see above). However, the
distinction between physical stimuli and \'social objects\' must be made clear.
We ourselves our \'social objects\', thus, we are implicated by such
categorisations. As Hogg and Abrams (1988) state: \'it would be perilous to
disregard this consideration\'. This can be seen in the accentuation of
out-group homogeneity (Park and Rothbart, 1982).
Tajfel (1981) made two
hypothesis on the cognitive consequences of categorisation. First, that if
stimuli are put into categories, then this in itself enhances the difference
between groups. Secondly, on a social level, individuals of different groups
appear more different from each other, and those of the same group, more
similar. Tajfel studied judgements of physical stimuli, using two categories,
and found that the extremes of these groups were exaggerated. However, the
differences within the two categories were reduced. This was the first of many
experiments testing the two hypotheses, all finding that introducing
categorisation into an otherwise undifferentiated situation, distorts people\'s
perceptual and cognitive reasoning, and their functioning. Further studies have
been conducted with the aim of taking these findings beyond the physical level,
and into the social context, by examining the favouritism of the in-group over
the out-groups - pre judgement, or stereotyping.
Horwitz and Rabbie
(1982) reported on an earlier experiment in which they demonstrated this
inter-group discrimination. They found that, in groups of four people, for there
to be any inter-group judgements, or biases, possibly a feeling of
interdependence was needed in addition to classification itself, even in the
most meaningless categorisation of groups. A more recent experiment that they
conducted found that, with larger group numbers, in-group - out-group
discrimination was present.
Tajfel (1981) studied the \'meaning\' of a
group, and found that simply belonging to a group, of no meaning, is enough to
lead to stereotyping. Simply belonging to a group meant that subjects were put
into one of two categories, that had no group characteristics attached to them
(i.e. interaction, beliefs, previous background). Such a design has become known
as the Minimal Group Paradigm. The subjects in this particular experiment were
assigned to one of the two categories by their preferences of a group of
paintings by two artists, and done so anonymously. Using code numbers (which
specified what group each subject was in) and a set of matrices, the subjects
were asked to allocate money to different people. They found that more money was
given to subjects of the same group than the other group. With no information
except group membership, this must have been the only cause for such
discrimination, maximising the differences between the two groups.
According to Allport\'s earlier definition of stereotyping, such a pre
judgement must be resistant to change. Such resistance may be put down to the
processes of thinking leading to biases (Howitt, et al., 1989), as seen in the
experiment above. For us to believe that our prejudgements are correct, what we
perceive to be is what we see. For example, Duncan (1976) showed that how we
perceive the social world can be affected by our categorisations, such as , in
this case, racial stereotypes. The study found that, because black people were
stereotyped as aggressive people (by the subjects), the subjects perceived a
situation as being more aggressive, close to a fight, when played by black
actors whereas with white actors, it was seen as playful.
Such biases
may also be looked at as self-fulfilling, or even self-protecting, the \'sense
of self\'. This self positivity is \'natural\', and as such can be projected
onto one\'s perception of the in-group - having similar effects at the other end
of the spectrum. That is, a negative view of an individual, projected onto
\'their\' group, or the out-group. This is the reason for most stereotypes being
negative.
Our categorisation and biases can also have an effect on
others. Essed (1988) found that white stereotyping of black people had a
damaging effect in job interviews, through discomfort and unrest due to the
questions asked during the interview. This study was conducted out of the
laboratory. A further example of the effects of racial stereotyping on others is
a replication of a British government commissioned study in which a black and a
white person apply to rent a flat. The landlords pre judgement of black people
through stereotyping affected the black man\'s chance and legal right to rent
the flat (BBC television, Black and White, 1987). This is an example of the
out-group homogeneity effect (Brown, 1995).
As well as exaggeration of
inter-group differences, another key effect of categorisation is the enhancement
of intra-group similarities, known as inter-group homogeneity. The effect of
this cognitive process of thought, through categorisation is the perception that
the out-group is more homogenous than the in-group
Hamilton (1979) found
that black families were viewed in more categorical terms than white families,
who were individually perceived. Jones, et al. (1981) found a similar effect;
that members of university clubs saw their group members\' personality traits as
more diverse than out-group members\'. A criticism of this study, and the
homogeneity effect as a whole, is that members of an in-group will know their
peers more than those of the out-group, especially in terms of personality.
Thus, such studies do not contribute wholly to the cognitive explanation of
stereotyping. However, the homogeneity effect has undergone investigation by
many studies, and conflicting evidence has arisen. Nevertheless, a point that
has been overlooked is that, with members of an in-group recognising variability
within their group, surely such variability is seen by members of an out-group,
within their group. This displays a cognitive error of ignorance. Even so, there
is no empirical evidence to support such a claim.
Categorisation,
according to the above, is a \'natural\' cognitive process, that \'naturally\'
leads to stereotyping. As Howitt, et al. (1989) state: \'cognitive dynamics [of
stereotyping] are a natural part of thinking because we must categorise the
social world, and in doing so, inevitably build up stereotypical assumptions,
protected by our cognitive biases\'.
The cognitive approach of
categorisation does have its flaws however. Categorisation theorists give a
rather mechanistic impression of cognition, and thus, their approach to
stereotyping (Billig, 1985).
We do have a choice in our assumptions and
there is a flexibility about human thinking (Howitt, et al., 1989). Therefore,
cognition is not as rigid as categorisation implies. It is an oversimplification
in itself to suggest that language oversimplifies the world, because it is due
to language that our views of the social world can be expressed. However,
language does not have to be present for stereotyping to be present. For
example, the Minimal Group Paradigm. Even so, language aids our categorisation
and thus, our stereotyping. It is the same language that we may use to
stereotype that enables us to be the reverse. For example, in the interviews
mentioned above, the interviewers could be taught to ask non-categorical
questions. As concepts in our minds, tolerance is as easy as prejudice.
Our supposed necessity to simplify the world, as we are \'incapable\' of
taking in \'every new stimulus as unique\' (Park and Rothbart, 1982), may also
be balanced by a statement of the opposite: \'we would find difficulty in
adapting to a world which required action, if no new stimulus could be treated
as unique, but every unique stimulus had to be considered as similar to others\'
(Billig, 1985). This is the basis of Billig\'s argument of particularisation
against categorisation - that gives rise to the processes of individualisation -
treating and perceiving group members as individuals. Categorisation argues
that, through our \'natural\' pattern of thought, or cognition, our perception
of stimuli is categorised by its similarities rather than its individuality.
Billig suggests that this can change, through a motivational process in
categorisation itself, giving flexibility to such cognitive processes.
We are aware of the possibility and ability to change. However, we do
not express this flexibility because it is a disruption of the norm, or, of the
social group-thought. Goffman (1959) views everyday life as dramaturgical (\'All
the world\'s a stage, and all the men and women merely players...\'
Shakespeare). To disrupt this would be to change the script, and break out of
the conformity of the social group, self-to-self and to others. Even so, this
illustrates that through our ability to categorise, we have the ability to
particularise and \'do more with the stimuli than accumulate more instances of
predetermined categories\' (Billig, 1985).
In Billig\'s alternative
approach to stereotyping, he also raises the point of category selection - a
problem that cognitive psychologists have often overlooked. Tversky and Gati
(1978) found that different stimuli are judged on their similarities and
differences before categorisation and this judgement can be different depending
on what way the stimuli is perceived. Billig\'s point is that we must
particularise before categorising and thus a link has been formed.
Categorisation implies a rigidity in our cognition. Stereotypes, by
nature, are over generalisations. Such inflexibility is not a possible process
of our cognition - \'categorisation do not exist in isolation\' (Billig, 1985).
As categorisation leads to many categories, through its definition, surely only
one such category could possibly be so rigid and inflexible, as other categories
must be used by it, and thus be flexible. Therefore, categorisation is not a
rigid process, but involves change - which is reflective of our cognition and
change is possible (conflicting with Allport\'s definition).
The
difference between two groups affects other attributes of the out-group,
including those that are similar to the in-group. By subdividing further such
similarities, we are initiating a defence against change in our attitudes and
categories. This inventiveness is another example of the flexibility of
categorisation. In the most extreme cases, this can lead to an inventiveness
demonstrated by racial theorists, which in fact, contradicts their prejudice and
rigidity of categories. This flexibility can be illustrated further by studies
that have shown that in stereotyping, people imply that most of a group posses a
stereotypic trait but not all members. Thus, is the need for \'special cases\',
realisation of individualisation and tolerance (Billig, 1985).
According
to the cognitive approach, stereotyping is a group process. It may occur in
groups, but it is the individual psyches that make up the group, that project
their stereotypes through a group. We do have the ability to see people as
individuals and particularise their unique characteristics. We can change, as
even categorisation is flexible, which undermines the cognitive approach with
categorisation, although it may take time on a social level.
To
conclude, the cognitive approach alone does not give us an understanding of
stereotyping. However, it does anchor the fact that through our \'natural\'
thought processes we do categorise, which leads to stereotyping. It also
highlights the importance of the individual and the group. There are, however,
problems that have been overlooked by cognitive psychologists which we need to
understand, in order to fully understand the \'changing dynamics and nature of
stereotyping in our society\' (Howitt, et al., 1989). There is also the need to
look further than the causes of stereotyping and into its effects in order to
understand the processes of our thought, of stereotyping.