Critically evaluate the cognitive theory of stereotyping.
B231: Social Interaction, Exam Paper 1998, Question 4.
Stereotyping is a form of pre
judgment that is as
prevalent in today's society as it was 2000 years ago. It is a social attitude
that has stood the test of time and received much attention by social
psychologists and philosophers alike. Many approaches to, or theories of
stereotyping have thus been raised. This essay evaluates the cognitive approach
that categorization is an essential cognitive process that inevitably leads to
stereotyping. Hamilton (1979) calls this a 'depressing dilemma'.
Brown's
(1995) definition of stereotyping through prejudice is the 'holding of
derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative
affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards members of
a group on account of their membership to that group'. This definition implies
that stereotyping is primarily a group process, through the individuals psyche's
within that group. A further idea of stereotyping, defined by Allport (1954) as
'thinking ill of others without warrant', is that people 'make their mind up'
without any personal experience. This pre judgment about a whole group is then
transferred to the stigmatization of any individuals in that group. It is these
ideas that the essay aims to evaluate, through the cognitive process of
categorization and the above definitions that bring about three distinct
features of stereotyping, that our cognition can be demonstrated through.
The first characteristic of stereotyping is over-generalization. A
number of studies conducted found that different combinations of traits were
associated with groups of different ethnic and national origin (Katz and Braly,
1933). However, stereotyping does not imply that all members of a group are
judged in these ways, just that a typical member of a group can be categorized
in such judgments, that they possess the characteristics of the group. Still,
when we talk of a group, we do so by imagining a member of that group.
The second feature and characteristic of stereotyping is the
exaggeration of the difference between ones own group (the in-group) and the
'other' group (the out-group). This can be traced back to the work of Tajfel
during the 1950's - 'the accentuation principle' (Tajfel, 1981). Tajfel's work
was specifically on physical stimuli, and concluded that judgments on such
stimuli are not made in isolation, but in the context of other factors. Applied
socially - a judgment about an out-group relies upon other factors surrounding
the judgment in question, as well as making a statement about the in-group and
the relationship between the two groups. Through stereotyping and categorization
we exaggerate the differences between the groups. From this comes the effect
that in believing an out-group is homogenous, through exaggerated differences,
their in-group is not - with very much less over-generalization taking place
(Linville, et al., 1986).
The third characteristic of stereotyping is
that of the expression of values. Most stereotypical judgments of group
characteristics are in fact moral evaluations (Howitt, et al., 1989). For
example, Katz and Braly (1933) studied a group of students' attitudes to towards
minority groups. They found that Jews were attributed to being 'mean' (in terms
of money), rather than they themselves being 'spendthrifts'. Also, they found
that there was a strong view that French people were 'excitable'. This actually
implies that they are over-excitable - above the norm, as everybody is
excitable, per se, and thus there would be no necessity to mention it.
Concluding from this, it is valid to say that a value has been put on a
characteristic - in this case, a stereotypical one.
A criticism with
much of this research is that participants are asked to make judgments out of
social context - in abstract situations. Howitt, et al. (1989) say that this
leads to a derogatory implication: that attributing a group with a
characteristic is also withholding others. However, stereotyping leads to more
than merely placing an adjective onto a group or category. The cognitive
processes that give reason to stereotyping are much deeper than this, giving
rise to the above characteristics.
The cognitive approach to
stereotyping is that we all stereotype, at varying levels - because of the
essential cognitive process of categorizations (Brown, 1995). Howitt, et al.
(1989) take this view also, and add that it is an ordinary process of thought to
over-generalize, and then protect it.
We live in a complex social
environment, which we need to simplify into groups, or categories. This
simplification is present at all levels of life - it is part of our language,
distinguishing between dog and cat, male and female, and even in the basic
motives of distinguishing between food and non-food. Such categorizations may
seem linguistically simple, but is essential - for example, the classification
of elements and organisms by biologists and chemists: 'one of the most basic
functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into
classifications' (Rosch, et al., 1976). However, the point must be made that,
even though language suggests so, categorisation leads to different functions
and features in non-humans and humans. For stereotyping is not present in
non-humans, thus, we may come to the conclusion that stereotyping is possible
through linguistics - this topic is discussed further later. This categorisation
also has varying depths of moral meaning, or value, which can lead to varying
levels of stereotyping. For example, the categorisation of Catholic - Protestant
in Northern Ireland. Categorisation is seen as a way of ordering what we
perceive (Billig, 1985), stimuli of the external world that needs to be
simplified, using 'iconic images, to pass into our short-term memory' (Neisser,
1976). This simplification process transforms James' 'blooming, buzzing
confusion' into a more manageable world in which it is easier to adapt -
categorisation is a cognitive adaptation. For we do not have the capability to
respond differently to each stimulus, whether it be a person, an object, or an
event. Categorisation is important in every day life, as well as in the most
extreme of circumstances - for example, the discrimination between friend and
foe.
For categorisation to be useful, we enhance the difference between
groups. This was found to be the case at both social and physical levels, and
later became known as the 'accentuation principle' (see above). However, the
distinction between physical stimuli and 'social objects' must be made clear. We
ourselves our 'social objects', thus, we are implicated by such categorisations.
As Hogg and Abrams (1988) state: 'it would be perilous to disregard this
consideration'. This can be seen in the accentuation of out-group homogeneity
(Park and Rothbart, 1982).
Tajfel (1981) made two hypothesis on the
cognitive consequences of categorisation. First, that if stimuli are put into
categories, then this in itself enhances the difference between groups.
Secondly, on a social level, individuals of different groups appear more
different from each other, and those of the same group, more similar. Tajfel
studied judgements of physical stimuli, using two categories, and found that the
extremes of these groups were exaggerated. However, the differences within the
two categories were reduced. This was the first of many experiments testing the
two hypotheses, all finding that introducing categorisation into an otherwise
undifferentiated situation, distorts people's perceptual and cognitive
reasoning, and their functioning. Further studies have been conducted with the
aim of taking these findings beyond the physical level, and into the social
context, by examining the favouritism of the in-group over the out-groups - pre
judgement, or stereotyping.
Horwitz and Rabbie (1982) reported on an
earlier experiment in which they demonstrated this inter-group discrimination.
They found that, in groups of four people, for there to be any inter-group
judgements, or biases, possibly a feeling of interdependence was needed in
addition to classification itself, even in the most meaningless categorisation
of groups. A more recent experiment that they conducted found that, with larger
group numbers, in-group - out-group discrimination was present.
Tajfel
(1981) studied the 'meaning' of a group, and found that simply belonging to a
group, of no meaning, is enough to lead to stereotyping. Simply belonging to a
group meant that subjects were put into one of two categories, that had no group
characteristics attached to them (i.e. interaction, beliefs, previous
background). Such a design has become known as the Minimal Group Paradigm. The
subjects in this particular experiment were assigned to one of the two
categories by their preferences of a group of paintings by two artists, and done
so anonymously. Using code numbers (which specified what group each subject was
in) and a set of matrices, the subjects were asked to allocate money to
different people. They found that more money was given to subjects of the same
group than the other group. With no information except group membership, this
must have been the only cause for such discrimination, maximising the
differences between the two groups.
According to Allport's earlier
definition of stereotyping, such a pre judgement must be resistant to change.
Such resistance may be put down to the processes of thinking leading to biases
(Howitt, et al., 1989), as seen in the experiment above. For us to believe that
our prejudgements are correct, what we perceive to be is what we see. For
example, Duncan (1976) showed that how we perceive the social world can be
affected by our categorisations, such as , in this case, racial stereotypes. The
study found that, because black people were stereotyped as aggressive people (by
the subjects), the subjects perceived a situation as being more aggressive,
close to a fight, when played by black actors whereas with white actors, it was
seen as playful.
Such biases may also be looked at as self-fulfilling,
or even self-protecting, the 'sense of self'. This self positivity is 'natural',
and as such can be projected onto one's perception of the in-group - having
similar effects at the other end of the spectrum. That is, a negative view of an
individual, projected onto 'their' group, or the out-group. This is the reason
for most stereotypes being negative.
Our categorisation and biases can
also have an effect on others. Essed (1988) found that white stereotyping of
black people had a damaging effect in job interviews, through discomfort and
unrest due to the questions asked during the interview. This study was conducted
out of the laboratory. A further example of the effects of racial stereotyping
on others is a replication of a British government commissioned study in which a
black and a white person apply to rent a flat. The landlords pre judgement of
black people through stereotyping affected the black man's chance and legal
right to rent the flat (BBC television, Black and White, 1987). This is an
example of the out-group homogeneity effect (Brown, 1995).
As well as
exaggeration of inter-group differences, another key effect of categorisation is
the enhancement of intra-group similarities, known as inter-group homogeneity.
The effect of this cognitive process of thought, through categorisation is the
perception that the out-group is more homogenous than the in-group
Hamilton (1979) found that black families were viewed in more
categorical terms than white families, who were individually perceived. Jones,
et al. (1981) found a similar effect; that members of university clubs saw their
group members' personality traits as more diverse than out-group members'. A
criticism of this study, and the homogeneity effect as a whole, is that members
of an in-group will know their peers more than those of the out-group,
especially in terms of personality. Thus, such studies do not contribute wholly
to the cognitive explanation of stereotyping. However, the homogeneity effect
has undergone investigation by many studies, and conflicting evidence has
arisen. Nevertheless, a point that has been overlooked is that, with members of
an in-group recognising variability within their group, surely such variability
is seen by members of an out-group, within their group. This displays a
cognitive error of ignorance. Even so, there is no empirical evidence to support
such a claim.
Categorisation, according to the above, is a 'natural'
cognitive process, that 'naturally' leads to stereotyping. As Howitt, et al.
(1989) state: 'cognitive dynamics [of stereotyping] are a natural part of
thinking because we must categorise the social world, and in doing so,
inevitably build up stereotypical assumptions, protected by our cognitive
biases'.
The cognitive approach of categorisation does have its flaws
however. Categorisation theorists give a rather mechanistic impression of
cognition, and thus, their approach to stereotyping (Billig, 1985).
We
do have a choice in our assumptions and there is a flexibility about human
thinking (Howitt, et al., 1989). Therefore, cognition is not as rigid as
categorisation implies. It is an oversimplification in itself to suggest that
language oversimplifies the world, because it is due to language that our views
of the social world can be expressed. However, language does not have to be
present for stereotyping to be present. For example, the Minimal Group Paradigm.
Even so, language aids our categorisation and thus, our stereotyping. It is the
same language that we may use to stereotype that enables us to be the reverse.
For example, in the interviews mentioned above, the interviewers could be taught
to ask non-categorical questions. As concepts in our minds, tolerance is as easy
as prejudice.
Our supposed necessity to simplify the world, as we are
'incapable' of taking in 'every new stimulus as unique' (Park and Rothbart,
1982), may also be balanced by a statement of the opposite: 'we would find
difficulty in adapting to a world which required action, if no new stimulus
could be treated as unique, but every unique stimulus had to be considered as
similar to others' (Billig, 1985). This is the basis of Billig's argument of
particularisation against categorisation - that gives rise to the processes of
individualisation - treating and perceiving group members as individuals.
Categorisation argues that, through our 'natural' pattern of thought, or
cognition, our perception of stimuli is categorised by its similarities rather
than its individuality. Billig suggests that this can change, through a
motivational process in categorisation itself, giving flexibility to such
cognitive processes.
We are aware of the possibility and ability to
change. However, we do not express this flexibility because it is a disruption
of the norm, or, of the social group-thought. Goffman (1959) views everyday life
as dramaturgical ('All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely
players...' Shakespeare). To disrupt this would be to change the script, and
break out of the conformity of the social group, self-to-self and to others.
Even so, this illustrates that through our ability to categorise, we have the
ability to particularise and 'do more with the stimuli than accumulate more
instances of predetermined categories' (Billig, 1985).
In Billig's
alternative approach to stereotyping, he also raises the point of category
selection - a problem that cognitive psychologists have often overlooked.
Tversky and Gati (1978) found that different stimuli are judged on their
similarities and differences before categorisation and this judgement can be
different depending on what way the stimuli is perceived. Billig's point is that
we must particularise before categorising and thus a link has been formed.
Categorisation implies a rigidity in our cognition. Stereotypes, by
nature, are over generalisations. Such inflexibility is not a possible process
of our cognition - 'categorisation do not exist in isolation' (Billig, 1985). As
categorisation leads to many categories, through its definition, surely only one
such category could possibly be so rigid and inflexible, as other categories
must be used by it, and thus be flexible. Therefore, categorisation is not a
rigid process, but involves change - which is reflective of our cognition and
change is possible (conflicting with Allport's definition).
The
difference between two groups affects other attributes of the out-group,
including those that are similar to the in-group. By subdividing further such
similarities, we are initiating a defence against change in our attitudes and
categories. This inventiveness is another example of the flexibility of
categorisation. In the most extreme cases, this can lead to an inventiveness
demonstrated by racial theorists, which in fact, contradicts their prejudice and
rigidity of categories. This flexibility can be illustrated further by studies
that have shown that in stereotyping, people imply that most of a group posses a
stereotypic trait but not all members. Thus, is the need for 'special cases',
realisation of individualisation and tolerance (Billig, 1985).
According
to the cognitive approach, stereotyping is a group process. It may occur in
groups, but it is the individual psyches that make up the group, that project
their stereotypes through a group. We do have the ability to see people as
individuals and particularise their unique characteristics. We can change, as
even categorisation is flexible, which undermines the cognitive approach with
categorisation, although it may take time on a social level.
To
conclude, the cognitive approach alone does not give us an understanding of
stereotyping. However, it does anchor the fact that through our 'natural'
thought processes we do categorise, which leads to stereotyping. It also
highlights the importance of the individual and the group. There are, however,
problems that have been overlooked by cognitive psychologists which we need to
understand, in order to fully understand the 'changing dynamics and nature of
stereotyping in our society' (Howitt, et al., 1989). There is also the need to
look further than the causes of stereotyping and into its effects in order to
understand the processes of our thought, of stereotyping.
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